We show that the algebraic structure of codes can exploited to improve significantly the efficiency of code reconstructions techniques especially in the case of quasi-cyclic LDPC codes with large and smooth block sizes. Such codes are widely implemented in various standards. We investigate the case where the transmission is eavesdropped. The eaves dropper has access to noisy codewords which transited through a binary symmetric channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a partially cooperative communication channel. The context could be that of an eavesdropper who for some or other reason has access to a sequence of noisy codewords encoded with a partially unknown code. The sequence was received through a binary symmetric channel and the eavesdropper has some partial information on the code. For instance he knows the code family (LDPC, turbo-code, convolutional. . . ) the blocklength or the memory of the encoder and possibly the architecture upon which the code was built as could be the case for some standards (convolutional structure, or quasi-cyclic). From this knowledge, the eavesdropper aims at reconstructing the code and the encoder which were used so as to 1) Remove the noise from the received sequence; 2) Recover the information vector, if for instance the encoding is systematic, or if he has some knowledge of the encoder. Reconstruction problems are long-standing problems. In particular, they have been considered for various classes of codes and in the general context where one has access to limited information on the code such as the family and the blocklength, [1] - [6] .
However, when implemented in embedded systems with very limited resources the codes are generally designed with a strong algebraic structure. The main reason is that an algebraic structure saves memory and potentially helps for parallelization, [17] for instance. This is especially the case for LDPC codes implemented in standards. The codes have very often a quasi-cyclic or a convolutional structure. Their blocklengths are also usually of several thousands of bits. For instance the DVB-S2 standard authorises LDPC codes with blocklengths 16 200 and 64 800 pseudo-randomly designed [8] , with quasi-cycles of length 360. For a complete survey of binary LDPC codes in standards, the reader can refer to [7] , chapter 4 (in French). This is the reason why we chose to focus on the so-called reconstruction of LDPC codes in a noisy environment, even if the proposed technique could be applied to other code families with the same type of structure, but certainly with less efficiency.
Code reconstruction consists in finding low-weight paritycheck equations or equivalently low weight codewords of the dual code. Without extra-information on the structure, this can be extremely painful in terms of memory and computational complexity. . The most efficient algorithms presented in [5] , [6] have an exponential complexity even if one targets only very small weight parity-check equations. In the case of cyclic codes some attempts were made to use the structure to improve the efficiency of reconstructing the generator polynomial of the code: One guesses the potential generator polynomial, then computes the weight distribution of the obtained syndromes and compares this distribution to the theoretical distribution. If there is a distortion, then the candidate polynomial is a factor of the generator polynomial, [9] - [11] .
We consider a completely different approach. The idea comes from the field of code-based cryptography where the security of McEliece-like cryptosystems based on quasi-cyclic codes is analysed, [12] , [13] . We suppose that an eavesdropper has access to the position of the orbits under the action of the permutation group of the code. Some codewords are received after transmission through a binary symmetric channel (BSC). From the knowledge of the orbits, he can make a projection or folding in the sense of [18] which transforms the problem of reconstructing a long LDPC code to the problem of reconstructing a code with smaller length, from the knowledge of noisier codewords.
Provided that the parameters are well chosen and that there are enough received codewords, there is a strong relation between parity-check equations of the folded/projected code and the original code. This approach can be iterated if the index of the quasi-cyclic code is smooth (can be factorised into many small factors). In that case it offers a potential trade-off between the algorithmic complexity and the amount of data available at the eavesdropper's end.
In a first part of the paper, we briefly recall the complexity of one of the most efficient technique in a noisy environment. This is also one of the simplest to analyse. In a second part, we recall the definition of quasi-cyclic codes. In a third part, we describe the so-called folding operation. We show that in the case where the code is quasi-cyclic, the dual of the folded code is also the folded of the dual code. In a fourth part, we finally explain how to exploit this property to improve the algorithmic complexity of the recovery of low-weight parity-check equations.
II. FINDING SMALL WEIGHT CODEWORDS IN NOISY

ENVIRONMENT
The eavesdropper has access to M noisy codewords b 1 , . . . , b M stemming from the same targeted code C of length n and dimension k. Reconstructing C in this context implies finding parity-check equations. Ideally sufficiently enough to generate the whole code, but practically recovering only a few equations already provides some useful information. In [5] the authors investigate two techniques dedicated to the recovery of parity-check equations of low Hamming weight. In a noisy environment, the most efficient one is the Chose-Joux-Mitton [14] (CJM) algorithm which is based on the search for collisions. The alternative technique is based on Gaussian elimination [3] . This latter technique is rather efficient whenever there are no noisy codewords, but it is very sensitive to noise magnitude. It was further improved in [6] combining the best of the two techniques by a sort of trade-off between Gaussian elimination and collision techniques. Since our goal in the paper is to demonstrate the advantage of using the algebraic structure of the targeted code in terms of data and computational complexity, so as to simplify our analysis we only consider the CJM algorithm.
We consider the following parameters:
1) The number of noisy available codewords b 1 , . . . , b M of length n is equal to M . This corresponds to the amount of data available at the eavesdropper's end; 2) The cross-over probability of the BSC channel is equal to 1/2 − ǫ; 3) The weight of the targeted parity-check equations is w. For simplicity we assume that n and w are even numbers. Then results from [5] , [7] imply that for sufficiently low false alarm threshhold one needs at least
2 codewords, that is one needs at least M n bits; • If M is large enough, the average computational cost in binary operations to find one parity-check equation is given by
where ℓ is a the size of the window on which collisions are considered. For applications this quantity is optimised to minimize the cost function. The impact in term of list size is:
where c is a small constant. 
III. QUASI-CYCLIC CODES
In the following of the paper we only deal with binary codes, although this framework can be adapted to the non-binary case. Quasi-cyclic codes are module codes over polynomial rings, [15] , [16] but for our purpose it is more meaningful to describe them as being invariant codes under the action of a cyclic permutation with constant size orbits. Any vector c ∈ GF (2) n where n = N p will be considered under the form
Definition 1 (Quasi-cyclic codes): Let C ⊂ GF (2) n , where n = N p. Then C is quasi-cyclic of index p if, up to permutation of the components of the code, we have
and >>> 1 denotes the right circular permutation of the components of the vectors c i of size p.
This implies in particular that the permutation group P erm(C) is non trivial and contains a cyclic group generated by a permutation τ which is a product of cycles of size p. The group action of τ is described in figure 1 . It is also usual to find more algebraic description of quasicyclic codes as module codes over a quotient polynomial ring [15] , [16] . However in our case we will use the permutation group structure. So we will only focus on the binary representation of code vectors.
Another well-known property is that quasi-cyclicity is invariant under the dual operation. If C is quasi-cyclic of index p, then C ⊥ is also quasi-cyclic of index p. Hence a quasi-cyclic code has a parity-check/generator matrix of the form 
where A ij are p × p binary circulant matrices.
IV. PROJECTION OR FOLDING OPERATION
The technique of projecting or folding a code by considering a subcode of a permutation invariant code and keeping only column per orbit is not new, see for instance [18] . This was recently applied to the analysis of the security of public-key encryption schemes based on MDPC/LDPC codes or LRPC codes with doubly-circulant structure, [12] , [13] . Since the term of folding is more employed in cryptography than the term of projecting, we will use the former one to denote our fundamental operation.
Let n = pN , τ ∈ S n a product of N cycles of size p. For i = 1, . . . , N . Let us denote by
Thus O i corresponds to the ith cycle of size p. Since the orbits form a partition of the set {1, . . . , n}, a vector of length n is labelled accordingly under the form
With this notation we define the folding operation. 
The vector b is a binary vector of length N and b is a preimage. An obvious property of this operation is that folding necessary decreases the Hamming weight:
Proposition 1: Let wt be the Hamming weight function, then wt( b) ≤ wt(b).
The folding operation being naturally additive, it can be extended to vector spaces and codes:
Definition 3 (Folded code): Let τ ∈ S n and let C ⊂ GF (2) n be a [n = pN, k, d] linear code. Then the folded code is the [N, k, d]-code defined by
Note that proposition 1 does not necessarily imply that d ≤ d. Namely, in theory, codewords of non-zero weight can be folded into the all zero vector. A description of the folding operation can be found at figure 2.
Fig. 2. Folding the code
In general, there is no obvious relation between an [n, k, d]code C and its corresponding folded [N, k, d]-code C except the obvious relation k ≤ pk. However whenever C is a quasi-cyclic code of index p this is another story and some interesting properties can be derived.
Proposition 2: Let C ⊂ GF (2 n ) be quasi-cyclic of index p, given by a generator matrix under the form (3) . Then the dimension k of the folded code C satisfies k ≤ J.
Proof 2: The idea is that a generator matrix of the folded code is the folded generator matrix. Furthermore, the p × n submatrix (A i1 , . . . , A iN ) is folded onto a p × N matrices of rank 1. Therefore, the number of independent rows of the generator matrix of the folded code is at most J. See [13] , [18] for more details.
The core result on which we base the subsequent analysis and simulations is the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let C ⊂ GF (2 n ) be a quasi-cyclic code of index p. Then we have Now since τ ∈ P erm(C), it is also in the permutation group of C ⊥ , therefore
by summing on j one obtains
Since the orbits have same size p, for j = 0, . . . , p − 1 and for any u ∈ O i , τ (u) describes the orbit. This implies that where C ⊂ GF (2) n is a quasi-cyclic code of index p, and e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ GF (2) n is an error vector modelizing the effect of a BSC with cross-over probability 1/2 − ǫ. This implies that the e i 's are realisations of identically distributed independent Bernoulli trials such that
Pr(e i = 0) = 1/2 + ǫ Pr(e i = 1) = 1/2 − ǫ By applying the folding operation of definition 2 to the vector b we obtain
where e = ( e 1 , . . . , e N ) is an error-vector modelizing a BSC channel with cross-over probability 1/2(1 − (2ǫ p )), that is
The independence of the random variables e i = u∈Oi e u is directly induced from the fact that the orbits O i consist of distinct elements.
Example 2: Suppose that the channel has cross-over probability 10 −3 then • if p = 2, the cross-over probability becomes 2 × 10 −3 ; • if p = 45, the cross-over probability becomes 4.3×10 −3 ; • if p = 360, the cross-over probability becomes 0.25.
VI. RECONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY
We have M binary vectors of length n = pN , say b 1 , . . . , b M . The reconstruction hypotheses are:
• for all j = 1, . . . , M , b j = c j + e j where c j ∈ C and e j modelizes a BSC channel with cross-over probability 1/2 − ǫ; • The code C is a quasi-cyclic code of index p, and the positions of the orbits are known to the receiver; • We use as a black-box the CJM algorithm described at section II; • The targeted parity-check equation weight is w. The reconstruction principle is: 1) Select a folding index p ′ dividing p such that p ′ is the largest integer satisfying
2) Use the folding operation with permutation τ ′ = τ p/p ′ a product of n/p ′ cycles of length p ′ ∀i, b i ∈ GF (2) n p ′ → b i ∈ GF (2) n/p ′ ;
3) Iterate CJM algorithm on the folded received vectors and obtain T parity-check equations of weight w for C say h 1 , . . . , h T ; 4) Find preimages h j of weight w of the equations h j .
• Step 1) determines the greatest folding index that we can choose knowing that M codewords were received so that the results of will be significant; • In step 2) the folding operation is applied to the received vectors. Once folded these correspond to noisy codewords of C modified by the action of a BSC with cross-over probability 1/2(1 − (2ǫ p ′ )). The inequality condition on the amount of received data ensures that there are enough codewords so that the statistical test of CJM algorithm is meaningful; This condition is clearly necessary, but is not sufficient. Namely, if w is larger than GV-bound it is not possible to distinguish the parity-check equation which was recovered from a randomly chosen parity-check equation. Different techniques to achieve step 4 can be imagined. The technique that we describe further with an example supposes that the index of the quasi-cyclic code is smooth (can be decomposed in small factors). Roughly speaking, a quasicyclic code of index p is also a quasi-cyclic code of index p ′ where p ′ is any divisor of p. This idea is thus to find a suitable p ′ and a path of divisors from 1 to p ′ :
This path of divisors gives also a path of folded codes
where p i+1 /p i is small typically less than 5. We find weight w parity-check equations for C i form weight w parity-check equations form C i−1 by testing the (p i /p i−1 ) w possibilities. Therefore, if the maximum of the p i /p i−1 is small, the complexity of step 4) is negligible.
This approach is well suited to the family of LDPC codes specified in the DVB-S2 standard, [8] . These codes have length 16 200 or 64 800. These are not quasi-cyclic, but can be made quasi-cyclic of index p = 360 by a public permutation and puncturing some positions. The index 360 = 2 3 From the results of section II, we obtain the following tables, where M in M is the minimum number of noisy codewords necessary for the reconstruction, and N b. Eq./Iter is the average number of parity-check equations of weight 8 found by one iteration of the CJM algorithm where the window ℓ is optimised accordingly. We ran an example with an implementation in C of the algorithm presented in section II. The code we considered was a rate 3/5 code of length n = 16 200 generated via the standards of DVB-S2, and noisy codewords were received over a channel with noise 1 · 10 −6 . We ran 1 iteration of the algorithm for different indexes. The amount of data on which we operated is M = 200 noisy codewords. The results are presented in the following table:
When searching parity-check equations of weight 8, our method speeds up the computational complexity by a factor of 50, and the list size factor gain is 300.
